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The Provision of Finance to Small Businesses:
Does the Banking Relationship
Constrain Performance
Christine T. Ennew
Martin R. Binks

The beneficial economic effects of entrepreneurial activity can only be realised
if such activity is relatively unconstrained in both product and factor markets,
finance has been widely identified as a potential constraint on entrepreneurial
activity due to either debt or equity gaps. However, in terms of externally sup
plied finance, it is arguably the availability of debt which is of greatest signifi
cance to most entrepreneurs. Given the inevitable information problems
associated with the provision of debt finance, the nature of the relationship
between bank and entrepreneur can be of considerable importance in ensuring
the appropriate financing decisions are made. This paper examines the link
between the banking relationship and the extent to which entrepreneurs are
constrained by financing arrangements. Empirical analysis of the extent to
which the banking relationship constrains performance suggests that there is no
significant difference between more and less successful entrepreneurs.

!•

INTRODUCTION

Although not restricted to small businesses, much entrepreneurial activity
is manifested through small firms. This entrepreneurial activity can contrib
ute to economic growth and development through the generation of jobs
(Storey & Johnson, 1987), by promoting competition and by facilitating
economic restructuring (Bolton, 1971). For these positive contributions to
be realized, it is im portant that firms are not constrained by imperfections
in either output markets (Mayes 8c Moir, 1989) or input markets (Binks &
Vale, 1990), the latter being the main focus of this paper. It has long been
argued that small size may preclude firms firom access to certain sectors of
the capital markets, resulting in finance gaps (Macmillan, 1931). Where
finance gaps exist, potential viable growth may be foregone. Restricted
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access to finance is not attributed directly to size; rather it reflects problems
of asymmetric information. Such information problems are not unique to
the small firms sector but are considerably more prevalent because of the
anticipated higher costs of information collection.
The relative costs and benefits of information collection mean that it is
unlikely that any financing transaction would be conducted under condi
tions of perfect information. When information is less than perfect some
firms may suffer from restricted access to finance. However, the more lim
ited the information available, the greater potential for misallocation of
funds and the greater the constraints on growth in the small firms sector. In
addition to cost factors, the extent of information asymmetry or communi
cation imperfections will be governed to a large extent by the nature of the
“relationship” between the suppliers and recipients of funds. Since small
firms rely predominantly on banks for external funds, the potential for
finance based constraints can be evaluated by some explicit analysis of the
relationship between banks and small firms. The paper examines this prop
osition in the context of small firms in the UK. Section II provides an over
view of factors governing the provision of finance to UK small businesses
and Section III discusses the problems of asymmetric inform ation and
examines the extent to which the banking relationship can, in principle,
ameliorate these problems. A model to test these propositions is presented
in Section IV while Section V discusses data collection and measurement.
The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in Section VI and the
conclusions from the study are presented in Section VII.
II.

THE PROVISION OF FINANCE TO SMALL BUSINESSES

The efficient and effective provision of finance to small firms has long been
recognized as a key factor in ensuring that those firms with genuine growth
potential can expand and compete and a number of studies have noted a
positive association between external finance, particularly bank finance,
and business peformance (Keasey & McGuiness, 1990; Keasey & Watson,
1992). In the UK, successive government sponsored enquiries, including
the Macmillan, Radcliffe, Bolton and Wilson Committees, have all high
lighted the problems experienced by small businesses in gaining access to
debt and equity finance. It is generally accepted that size may preclude
firms from access to certain sectors of the capital markets, particularly where
equity finance is concerned. The development of the venture capital market
and the introduction of the Business Expansion Scheme have improved the
supply of equity finance to small businesses in the UK, although recent evi
dence suggests that the equity gap has not been eliminated (Harrison &
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Mason, 1990). Arguably, however, it is in relation to debt that the problem
of access to finance may be more pressing, since debt is generally identified
as the most common type of external finance used by small businesses in
both the UK (Keasey & Matson, 1992) and the US (Scherr, Sugrue, & Ward,
1993). In the UK, access to external equity from venture and development
capital firm s is typically restricted to projects requiring in excess of
£250,000 while informal sources from Business Angels are still embryonic
(Mason, Harrison, & Chaloner, 1992). Even in cases where projects are largeenough to justify venture capital, there is evidence to suggest that a large
number of small businesses are resistant to external equity participation
(Binks, Ennew, & Reed, 1992; Cowling, Samuels, & Sugden, 1991; Dow,
1992). Consequently, small businesses in the UK rely primarily on debt
finance from the banking sector either in the form of fixed term loans, or
more commonly, overdraft finance (lines of credit). Where such businesses
experience difficulties in obtaining debt finance, potential viable growth
may be foregone. If such difficulties occur with any regularity then they may
inhibit the positive economic contribution which would be expected from
the small firms sector.
Difficulties in obtaining debt finance do not refer simply to the fact that
some firms cannot obtain funds through the banking system. Indeed, we
should not expect that all projects would automatically be financed. Genu
ine difficulties occur first, in situations in which a project which is viable and
profitable at prevailing interest rates is not undertaken because the firm is
unable to obtain appropriate funding and second, in situations in which
viable projects can only obtain funding on apparently disadvantageous
terms. Restricted access to finance is not necessarily attributable directly to
size, but is instead a result of the problems associated with the availability
of information on which projects are evaluated (Berger & Udell, 1993; Constand, Osteryoung, & Nast, 1991; Keasey &: Watson, 1993). Such informa
tion problems are not imique to the small firms sector, but are considerably
more prevalent there because of the anticipated higher costs of information
collection. This paper focuses attention specifically on issues surrounding
the provision of debt finance although the analysis may be generalized to
deal with issues relating to the provision of equity finance.
III. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AND THE BANKING RELATIONSHIP
Inform ation asymmetry poses two problems for the provision of debt
finance. First, the bank cannot observe ex ante certain information which is
relevant to the decision to enter into the contract, typically the actual abil
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ities of the individuals applying for finance and the qualities of the project
(adverse selection). Second, the risk that the small business will not perform
in a manner consistent with the contract, necessitates some form of ex post
monitoring procedure (moral hazard). In principle, information could be
collected with respect to the abilities of the entrepreneur, the nature of the
industry, and market and the behavior of the business once finance has been
made available. In practice, the cost of gathering such information at a sin
gle point in time is likely to be high, and in most cases prohibitively high,
relative to the risk and return associated with any given project. Even if a
comprehensive information set were available, the bank is likely to encoun
ter difficulties in processing that information, thus limiting its practical use
fulness. However, during the lifetime of a firms relationship with its bank,
there exists considerable potential gradually to accumulate information
(Berger & Udell, 1993; Sharpe, 1989) which might be expected to ease the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
The implications of these information asymmetries for the provision of
debt finance have been evaluated from a theoretical standpoint in a num
ber of studies. Thus, for example, in examining capital market failure,
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) identify debt gaps as a result of both adverse selec
tion and moral hazard problems. The adverse selection effect is analogous
to that observed in insurance markets and arises because borrowers have
different degrees of risk attached to their projects. As interest rates rise
low-risk borrowers (although having viable projects) drop out leaving only
high-risk borrowers. This is reinforced by the moral hazard problem asso
ciated with the lender’s inability^ to monitor the project undertaken; again
it is shown that as interest rates rise the higher-risk projects will be substi
tuted for the lower-risk projects, and there will be equilibrium credit ration
ing (see also Bester & Hellwig, 1989). A contrary view is expressed by de
Meza and Webb (1987) who identify adverse selection in the presence of dif
ferent (but unobservable) entrepreneurial abilities as leading to an oversup
ply of credit rather than a debt gap.
While there is a need for further work to reconcile these views, there is
evidence to suggest that they may not be mutually exclusive. Berger and
Udell (1989) a i ^ e that while the macro effects of credit rationing may be
small, there is evidence to suggest that when credit is rationed to some firms
it may be more readily available to others. In particular, this result may be
related to the role of collateral in bonding debt finance. Indeed, fipom a the
oretical perspective it has been shown that the availability of sufficient col
lateral can counteract these problems; the low-risk borrowers who leave the
market in the Stiglitz-Weiss model can signal their status by a willingness to
offer appropriate levels of collateral, and the taking of collateral by the
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banks can provide an incentive to ensure that the firm will perform to the
best of its abilities in undertaking the project (Bester, 1987). However, if col
lateral is in limited supply, debt gaps may still exist. In effect, the informa
tion costs associated with the evaluation and monitoring of a project may
prohibit an income gearing or prospects based approach to project evalua
tion, thus causing the lender to default to a capital gearing approach which
is contingent upon the availability of sufficient collateral. This collateral
may be in the form of either personal or business assets. As Dempsey and
Keasey (1993) note, securitizing loans against appropriate assets (prefera
bly personal) represents a rational approach for banks in the face of high
project evaluation costs because it allows good projects to self-select. The
downside of such approaches may be that valuable projects may be lost in
instances in which the proposer has inadequate personal collateral. In addi
tion, the provision of personal collateral in the form of a guarantee or
house deeds effectively erodes limited liability status and the protection it
provides. This may be expected to discourage investment at the margin,
given the additional personal risk it implies.
Small firms may also experience a debt gap because they have insuffi
cient business collateral. With a capital-gearing approach, a debt gap may
be more fi-equent in the case of small firms because asset-backed collateral
must be valued at “carcass value” prices to ensure that the loan is covered
realistically in the event of default and immediate realisation. Loans for
specific items of plant and equipment will require more than the current
resale price of the equipment for full collateral since the depreciation rate
of the machinery will often be assumed by the bank to surpass that of the
decline in loan values outstanding in the early periods of repayment.
Thus inform ation problems can produce financial constraints either
because debt finance is not provided or is only provided on disadvanta
geous terms. Although perfect information is an unobtainable goal, the
quantity and quality of information available to a bank will be influenced by
the nature of the relationship with each business (Berger 8c Udell, 1993). A
close relationship has the potential to provide the bank with a better under
standing of the operating environm ent facing a particular business; a
clearer picture of the managerial attributes of the owner and a more accu
rate overview of the prospects for the business. Thus, firom the perspective
of the bank, the relationship provides the basis for understanding customer
needs and resources and identifying the most appropriate ways of meeting
those needs. This relationship is not simply a one way process. An effective
banking relationship requires a positive contribution from both parties.
The ability of the bank to meet customer needs requires that the owner/
manager provides the bank with appropriate and timely information and is
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receptive to suggestions and advice provided by the bank. The develop
ment of close working relationships between banks and small businesses has
often been identified as a weakness of traditional Anglo-Saxon banking sys
tems (Edwards, 1987; Yao-Su Hu, 1984) and a comparative analysis of
medium sized enterprises in Germany, France, and the UK lends some sup
port to this hypothesis (Binks, Ennew, & Reed, 1992). Nevertheless, many
of the recent developments in the provision of banking services to small
businesses in the UK have attem pted to deal with this weakness, particu
larly through the introduction of specialist small business account manag
ers.
In the absence of close working relationships between banks and small
businesses there remains the potential for finance to constrain entrepre
neurial activity. In the absence of detailed micro-data of the sort that ideally
would be supplied to the banks, it is impossible to measure objectively
either the extent to which businesses are constrained or the extent to which
viable growth has been lost. However, from the perspective of the owner
manager, it may not be the real extent of the constraint that is relevant but
rather the perceived extent of the constraint. Where an owner manager
perceives his/her business to be constrained by the bank, this may in itself
be sufficient to act as a disincentive to growth plans.
It is not possible to measure the extent to which finance gaps constrain
entrepreneurial activity, but the effect of such gaps will tend to be greatest
on small firms with growth potential, in part because it is here that a close
relationship with suppliers of finance and a good flow of information are
particularly important in order to incorporate fiiture income prospects in
the investment decision. A closer relationship, and consequently more
accurate in fo rm atio n exchange, w ould ceteris paribus increase the
income-gearing element of project evaluation and reduce the loan gap.
This is not a smooth process however, since the collection of information
over and above simple descriptive statistics causes a discrete and dispropor
tionately large rise in costs to the financial institution concerned because
the assessment of more qualitative aspects such as m anagement skills is
more time consuming to perform and requires a much higher level of
investment in the training of those undertaldng the evaluation.
IV

MODEL SPECIFICATION

As the previous sections have argued, the perform ance and growth of
smaller businesses may be constrained by restrictions on access to finance.
Such restrictions may vary from the limited availability of credit through to
the availability of credit in insufficient quantities or on inappropriate terms.
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The previous section has discussed the nature of these financial constraints
and has argued that the source of such constraints lies essentially with prob
lems of inform ation availability and processing. While recognizing that
many of these information problems have no realistic solution, it can be
argued that the nature of the relationship between banks and small busi
nesses can either ameliorate or exacerbate such problems. Thus the nature
of the banking relationship can be seen as a crucial element in the provision
of finance to business in general (Turnbull 8c Gibbs, 1987) and small firms
in particular (Watson, 1986). A good banking relationship will improve the
quality and quantity of inform ation flows and thus may be expected to
reduce the extent to which businesses are or feel constrained by banking
practices. This does not mean that a good banking relationship leads to the
acquisition of finance more than a poor banking relationship, but rather
that in a good banking relationship, the flow of information is such that
both parties will have a better xmderstanding of each other; banks will make
more informed decisions and firms will be more aware of the reasoning
behind those decisions. Thus the firm that is refused access to finance and
has a good banking relationship may feel less constrained than a counter
part with a poorer banking relationship since the former should have some
“ownership” of the decision.
Formally, we suggest that the following model may be employed to
understand the way in which bank service may constrain a business:
CONSTRAINT = /{Relationship, Product Characteristics, Business Characteristics)

Since the true extent to which a business is constrained by its banking
relationship cannot be directly measured, the model focuses on the degree
to which a business is perceived to be constrained. In the absence of any
clear grounds for selecting functional form, the hypothesized relationships
are assumed to be linear.
The quality of the banking relationship is expected to reduce the degree
to which a business feels constrained by the policies of its bank. While there
is a clear focus on the nature of the banking relationship in this model, the
potential for other factors to affect the degree to which a business is con
strained is explicitly recognized. Since most firms will already have some
bank financing, perceptions of constraints may be affected by the charac
teristics of the products currently being provided and particularly by the
interest rate payable, the collateral requirement, and the availability of
appropriate amounts of debt. O ther things being equal, more attractive
product characteristics should reduce the degree of perceived constraint.
Fmally, it may be argued that additional firm specific characteristics may
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affect the banking relationship and thus influence perceptions of con
straints. In particular, age of firm may affect the perceived constraint
because older firms will have a more established relationship with their
banks and the banks may be in a position to draw on information generated
by past lending experiences (Sharpe, 1989). Equally, it can be argued that
turnover may affect constraints given that the costs of information collec
tion and processing will tend to be lower as firms get larger. Finally, the per
formance of a particular business may also affect the perceived degree of
constraint in that more successfiil businesses may be expected to have a bet
ter relationship with their bank than less successfiil businesses.
V. DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT

Data used for the empirical analysis were obtained from a survey conducted
among its members by the Forum of Private Business (FPB) in spring/summer 1992 (Binks, Ennew, 8c Reed, 1993). Approximately 16,000 question
naires were distributed to the entire membership, along with a follow up
reminder after three weeks. This resulted in 6101 usable responses which
represents a response rate of 37.5 percent. A comparison of the sample with
the national population of small businesses reveals some biases. Specifically,
the sample has a higher than expected proportion of manufacturing firms
and a lower than expected proportion of agricultural firms and there is
some bias within the sample towards firms located in the southeast of
England and away from firms located in the southwest of England. Neither
of these problems were considered particularly significant. The presence of
a relatively small number of agricultural firms may actually be desirable
given the unique nature of the problems facing farming businesses. Simi
larly, in the context of the UK market, the uneven distribution of respon
dents between southeast and southwest is unlikely to cause problems
because there are few grounds for believing that the experiences of these
two regions would differ significantly.
Respondents to the survey range fk>m very small businesses through to
those which would be considered as medium rather than small. Thirty per
cent of firms had a turnover of less than £150,000 per year and the majority
of these (22%) had a turnover between £50,000 and £150,000, with only
eight percent reporting a turnover of less than £50,000. Seventeen percent
reported turnovers between £150,000 and £250,000 and a further 20 per
cent between £250,000 and £500,000. It is noticeable that 17 percent of
respondents had turnover in excess of the £ 1,000,000 threshold which is
sometimes used to define the margin between small and medium sized
business. Around 47 percent of firms in the sample reported a profit level

Banks and Small Business Financing

65

of between zero percent and 10 percent as a percentage of turnover. This
contrasts with a figure of 40 percent for this profit category in a similar sur
vey in 1990 (Binks, Ennew, & Reed, 1990). Reasons for this change are
almost certainly linked to the prevailing recession. Perhaps surprisingly,
therefore, the proportion of firms reporting profits in excess of 20 percent
against turnover is almost exactly the same as in 1990, with figures of 29
percent in the present survey as against 31 percent in 1990. However, aver
age profit for respondents in the current sample was 16.7 p ercen t, which
was significantly lower than the 1990 average of 18.2 p ercen t. Such a fall
was to be expected given recessionary conditions. The fact that the reduc
tion in profitability is relatively small is likely to be a reflection of the loss
fipom the sector of a large number of low profit firms.
A high proportion of respondents were experiencing low or negativegrowth rates, as might be expected given the prevailing economic climate.
Again this contrasts sharply with the results from a previous survey. In 1990
only nine percent of firms reported a decline in turnover over the previous
three years. The corresponding value for 1992 is 48 percent. In 1990, 30
percent of firms reported growth in excess of 20 percent per annum. The
corresponding figure for 1992 was 9.4 percent. Firms currently declining or
growing slowly typically expect to follow similar patterns in the immediate
fiiture, and it is only among the firms which are currently fast growth that
there is a substantial expectation of future fast growth. Thus, the basic char
acteristics of the sample are indicative of a small firms sector which is suf
fering significantly fi-om the effects of the recession, but within which there
is evidence of a significant number of firms which are prospering and grow
ing in spite of prevailing economic conditions.
The survey contained a variety of questions which related to the con
straints faced by business and the nature of the relationship between busi
nesses and th eir banks. T hese data, along with basic dem ographic
characteristics and details on financing were used empirically to test the
model suggested above.
In order to measure the extent to which a business is constrained,
respondents were required to score seven aspects of bank practice which
might constrain their business, namely collateral requirements, interest
rates, availability of credit, bank charges, competence of manager, speed of
service and term of loan. These items were combined to form a scale which
measured at an aggregate level, the degree to which respondents believed
that their business was constrained by banking practice. Each aspect of con
straint was scored on a scale from l= n o constraint to 5 = severe constraint;
summing across all items produced a dependent variable (CONSTRAINT)
with values in the range 7 to 35. Higher scores on the constraint variable
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indicated that respondents perceived their business to be highly con
strained by bank practices. Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86 indicated that this
scale was reliable.
Three specific aspects of the bank-business relationship were measured;
the importance attached to aspects of bank service, the quality of provision
and the attributes of bank managers. Each aspect of the relationship was
measured using a set of multi-item scales. All these items were measured on
the basis of respondents own perceptions and a list of the scale items is pre
sented in the Appendix. To identify the underlying dimension for each
aspect of the relationship, each set of scale items was subject to a factor anal
ysis using principal components extraction. This resulted in the identifica
tion of three underlying dimensions for each aspect of the relationship.
The importance aspect of the relationship measured the respondents
assessments of the importance of particular aspects of bank service. Factor
analysis suggested that three underlying dimensions were present and
these three factors accounted for approximately 70 percent ojf variance in
the original data set. The first (IMPK) measured the importance attached
to bank knowledge and advice; the second (IMPPE) measured the impor
tance attached to personalization in the service delivery process and the
third (IMPPR) measures the im portance associated with more specific
product characteristics such as interest rates, chaises, and range of services.
For a given quality of provision, respondents who identify certain aspects of
bank services as important are more likely to feel constrained by the service
provided than respondents who identify these aspects as less important.
The quality aspect of the relationship was measured using an identical
set of scale items. Again the factor analysis identified three underlying
dimensions based on knowledge (ACTK), personalisation (ACTPE)and
product characteristics (ACTPR). These factors accounted for 74 percent of
the variance in the original data set. The extent to which respondents per
ceive their businesses to be constrained is likely to be negatively related to
their perceptions of the quality of service provided. For each of these six
variables, higher values are indicative of higher importance and higher
quality.
Finally the nature of the relationship between the respondent and their
manager was measured across a range of statements scored on a 5 -point
Likert scale. Factor analysis suggested three underlying factors which
accounted for 60 percent of the variance in the original data set. The first
was concerned with the absence of trust and confidence in the relationship
(BMT) with higher scores being indicative of a lack of trust and confidence.
The second factor concerned the degree of approachability and equality in
the relationship (BMA) with higher scores indicating that managers were
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more approachable. The final factor concerned information flows (BMI)
with higher scores on this factor indicating a reluctance to provide informa
tion on the part of respondents.
A num ber of variables were included to describe current financing
arrangements. Since the number of firms in the sample with overdrafts is
significantly larger than the num ber of firms with fixed term loans, the
characteristics of overdrafts were used as an indicator of current financing
arrangements. Rate of interest was measured as percentage points above
base (ROI), and collateral ratios (ODCOL) were measured in relation to
overdraft limits, with adjustm ents for outstanding mortgages when the
owner/managers house represented the collateral. To obtain some indica
tion of the extent to which the finance provided was adequate, the level of
overdraft use, calculated as the ratio of amount overdrawn to size of over
draft limit, was used as a crude indicator (ODUSE), although it is acknowl
edged that this may also be an indicator of the extent to which any given
firm is experiencing financial difficulties. Additionally, given the differ
ences in type o f collateral taken, a dummy variable (COLTYPE) was
included which took a value of one where respondents were required to pro
vide personal collateral and zero where business or no collateral was
required. A priori, the decision to take personal collateral, because of its
implications for lim ited liability status, m ight be expected to result in
respondents feeling that their business is more constrained by bank prac
tice.
Fmally, four firm-specific characteristics, namely age and size, profit
ability, and growth rate were identified as potentially influencing the per
ceived degree of constraint. Age of firm (AGE) entered the model directly
as a continuous variable as did profitability (PROFIT). Size of business
(TURNOVER) and rate of growth (GROWTH) entered the model as ordi
nal variables covering nine size categories and six growth categories respec
tively.
Age was hypothesized to have a negative effect on the perceived degree
of constraint as suggested by Sharpe (1989). Similarly size, growth rate, and
profitability were expected to have negative effects in that the larger more
successful firms were expected to have better relationships with their banks
on the grounds that, in an objective sense such firms should be considered
good risks.
VI.

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

The model was estimated using ordinary least squares regression, with the
basic estimated form as follows:
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CONSTRAINT = F{IMPK{+), IM PPE{+), IM PPR{+), ACTK{-),
ACTPE{-), ACTPR{-), BM T{+), BMAir),
ODUSE{+), RO I{+), ODCOL{+), COLTYPE (+),
TURNOVER{-), GROWTH (-) PROFIT {-),AGE (-))

with the signs in parentheses indicating the a priori expectations about the
direction of the relationship. The dependent variable, although based on a
simple interval scale, was constructed in such a way that it could take a value
in the range 7-35. The spread of values was such that this variable could
effectively be treated as continuous for the purposes of statistical analysis ^
Visual inspection of the residuals suggested that the linear form was appro
priate and that neither heteroscedasticity nor non-normality were present.
The unrestricted model specified above contains relationship variables,
financing variables, and firm specific characteristics. Two further restricted
models were estimated. In Model 2, it was assumed that the coefficients
relating to firm specific characteristics were not significantly different fi-om
zero. Model 3 incorporated the further restriction that the coefficients on
variables relating to current financing arrangements were also not signifi
cantly dijBFerent from zero, i^-tests were used to test the acceptability of these
restrictions. The results for each of these three models are contained in
Table 1. In both cases, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to
zero is rejected; neither set of restrictions is valid and we should focus there
fore on the unrestricted model.
On the basis of the estimated equations, the extent to which owner/
managers believe their business to be constrained by banking practices is
dependent on the nature of the banking relationship, financing conditions,
and firm specific characteristics. Specifically, the perceived degree of con
straint is positively related to assessments of the importance of various
aspects of bank services and negatively related to assessments of the quality
of provision of those services. The magnitude of the impact of each of the
significant variables differs, with knowledge and personalization appearing
to have a greater weight than product features. In the case of the qualitj^ of
provision variables, product related aspects appear to be of much greater
importance than personalization or knowledge variables. Lower levels of
trust and confidence in the bank manager tend to increase the degree of
perceived constraint while the approachability of the m anager tends to
reduce the degree of constraint. Higher rates of interest and higher levels
of overdraft use tend to increase the degree of constraint. Interestingly, the
sign of the coefficient on the variable measuring collateral ratio is counter
to what was expected, although the estimated coefficient is not significantiy
different from zero. The dummy variable for personal collateral is clearly
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Table 1
Unrestricted and Restricted Models (OLS)
Model 1

Model 2

M odels

Coeffici ent

T Ratio

Coefficient

T Ratio

Coeffici ent

T Ratio

17.31

13.83**

16.84

14.27**

20.41

17.79**

IMPK

0.26

9.6**

0.26

9.69**

0.27

10.08**

IMPPR

0.07

1.42

0.06

1.32

0.05

1.09

IMPPE

0.19

5.15**

0.19

4.58**

0.21

6.06**

ACIK

-0.15

-4.01**

-0.15

-4.08**

-0.17

-4.43**

ACTPR

-0.35

-7.78**

-0.35

-7.63**

-0.40

8.63**

ACTTE

-0.28

-8.40**

-0.29

-8.58**

-0.29

8.52**

BMT

0.25

7.75**

0.25

7.88**

0.26

7.97**

BMA

-0.26

-5.03**

-0.26

-5.05**

-0.27

-5.38**

BMI

-0.11

-1.59

-0.14

-1.93

-0.16

2.26*

—

—

—

—

CONSTANT

ODUSE

0.49

ODCOL

-0.01

3.96**
-1.15

0.49
-0.01

3.94**
-1.41

COLTYPE

1.59

7.81**

1.63

8.13**

—

—

ROI

0.56

5.75**

0.53

5.71**

—

—

-0.02

3.03**

—

—

—

0.06

1.11

—

—

—

—
—

GROWTH

-0.10

-1.74

—

—

—

—

AGE

-0.01

-2.25*

—

—

—

—

PROFIT
TURN
OVER

R2
F

118.19

P=0.000

F (Restrict)
N
Notes:

0.399

0.428

0.432

2620

151.89

P=0.000

194.55

P=0.000

5.37

P=0.000

33.86

P=0.000

2620

2620

*Significant at P = 0.05
**Sigmficant at P = 0.01

significant and positive indicating that in situations in which entrepreneurs
are required to provide personal collateral the outcome is likely to be a
much greater perceived constraint in that business.
O f the firm specific variables, size and growth rates both display the
expected signs but neither coefficient is significantly different firom zero.
Profitability and age do appear to affect the perceived degree of constraint.
As was suggested, older firms with a longer track record and typically a
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longer banking relationship tend to be less constrained and similarly, the
more profitable firms also perceive themselves to be less constrained.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

Information asymmetries and transactions costs inevitably mean that the
bank/small business relationship will occur under conditions of imperfect
information. Imperfect information is, in turn, one of the main reasons why
firms face constraints in the market for finance. The nature of the relation
ship between banks and businesses can affect the extent to which businesses
are constrained because of its effect on the flow of information. The extent
to which a business finds itself constrained in relation to access to finance is
difficult to measure directly although a usefiil indicator can be obtained
from self assessed degrees of constraint. Using such a measure, this paper
examined the links between degree of constraint and aspects of the banking
relationship. Initial results suggest that most dimensions of the banking
relationship do have a significant impact on the extent to which businesses
feel constrained. Furthermore, the extent to which these constraints are
apparent is also related to financing conditions and firm specific character
istics. Age and profitability tend to reduce the degree to which a constraint
is perceived to exist, although the taking of personal collateral, high levels
of overdraft usage, and high interest rates all tend to increase the perceived
degree of constraint. While this latter result may not be unexpected and
might in many instances reflect simply the risk-return characteristic of a
project, the importance of the relationship variables is indicative of the sig
nificant role played by the less formal aspects of banking in the develop
ment of a strong entrepreneurial small business sector.
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NOTE
1. A similar approach was adopted by Scherr, Sugrue and Ward (1993) for categorical data
in the range 1-11. In such situations OLS may result in higher standard errors and thus
fewer significant results, but the approach is generally deemed to be acceptable on the
grounds of computational simplicity.
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APPENDIX
_________Scales U sed in Measuring the Banking Relationship ______
a)

Importance attached to dimensions of the banking relationship.

How important is each of these services to you?
(Ranked on a scale from 1 = not important to 5 = very important).
IM PK

Knows your business
Understands your industry
Understands your market
Offers helpfiil business advice
IMPPR

Offers wide range of banking services
Competitive interest rates
Competitive/predictable charges
IMPPE

Speed of decision
Tailors finance to needs to business
One person deals with all credit needs
Easy access to loan officer
b)

Quality of Service Provision

How well do you think your bank supplies these particular requirements?
(Ranked on a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = very good).
ACTK

Knows your business
Understands your industry
Understands your market
Offers helpful business advice
ACTPR

Offers wide range of banking services
Competitive interest rates
Competitive/predictable charges
ACTPE

Speed of decision
Tailors finance to needs to business
One person deals with all credit needs
Easy access to loan ofiBcer
c)

Relationship with Bank Manager

The following statements about the bank/small business relationship were scored on a
scale from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.
BMT

My bank manager is always available to help in a crisis.
My bank manager often comes forward with positive suggestions to help my business.
I am confident in the advice I get from my bank manager.
I am confident that my bank understands small businesses.
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I can rely on my bank manager to find ways of meeting my business’s changing finan
cial needs.
BMA

I prefer to avoid contact with my bank manager.
My bank manager is not really interested in my business.
I feel intimidated when dealing with my bank.
My bank manager is only prepared to offer standard financial small business products.
BMI

It is important to provide my bank manager with timely and regular management
information.
It is important to discuss in advance potential excesses over agreed borrowing limits.
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